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THE RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY 
OF FAITH
I. THE PROBLEM  
For the accountability of belief the response to the question of whether religious experience is 
rational is important. That which we claim for Christian faith should also obtain for religious 
experience: religious experience transcends human reason but does not destroy it. 
Nevertheless, there is a problem here. Is the  concept ‘religious experience’ not self-
contradictory, thereby justifying the accusation that it is irrational? Accusations of 
irrationality seem out of place, however, for religious experience is a broadly accepted term, 
used in the  titles of such well-known books as William James’ The Varieties of Religious 
Experience and Wayne Proudfoot’s Religious Experience. There are innumerable  accounts  
of people who have had religious experiences: the mystical experiences of St. John of the 
Cross or St. Theresa of Avila, or the sudden conversion experiences of believers that James 
describes. There is also religious experience as a lasting experience of the ‘ordinary believer’, 
on the basis of which he lives with and understands  the world and people and which informs 
how he acts.
Philosophically, however, one can pose the question of whether an experience of 
religious Transcendence is at all possible. Experience implies, according to Husserl, 
intentionality, i.e. the intention of the subject to direct himself at something. Does this not 
conflict with the uniqueness of the manifestation of God who announces himself, regardless 
of any intention on the part of the human being? Is the experience of God not a matter of a 
call to us that breaks through our horizon instead of one of our directing ourselves at 
Something or Someone? This problem has been posed by Levinas and has received  attention 
by Henry and Marion in contemporary French philosophy. But long before that philosophers 
such as Descartes and Kant and theologians such as Schleiermacher and Tillich understood 
that there was a problem here. How is religious Transcendence, which overcomes human 
beings, to be described? How is religious experience to be described, if it transcends not only 
2the subject/object relation but also all mundane relations? Thus the term ‘religious 
experience’ seems to be a contradictio in terminis because the contact with God cannot be 
described in terms of intentionality, of engagement with something that belongs to this world.
In this paper I will demonstrate that one can speak of religious experience and that 
religious experience is not a-rational but rational in nature. This allows, of course, for the 
possibility that any number of actual religious experiences can be irrational through 
imagination or an illusory belief. I will investigate the extent to which living on the basis of a 
lasting religious experience entails fideism, the view that religious experience cannot be 
discussed rationally.
I will first take up the question of whether religious experience is a self-contradictory 
concept. Thereafter I will elaborate on my assertion that religious experience is rational in 
nature by indicating what religious experience is and what rationality is. Religious experience 
appears to have at least three aspects. For now, I will describe it as an experience in which the 
whole person is gripped by religious Transcendence. I view rationality as a normative concept 
that entails the correct and responsible use of our abilities as human beings to use reason.
In showing that religious experience with its different aspects is rational in nature, I do 
not intend to derive religious experience from reason. To the contrary, religions are not 
concerned with horizontal transcendence, an expansion of our horizons, a transcendence that 
always remains an finitude that is stretched to infinity, but with a vertical transcendence that 
is not constructed by humankind and cannot be derived from reason.
II. THE TRANS-INTENTIONAL ASPECT OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Experiences of real transcendence are, according to Levinas, not experiences in the strict 
sense of the word1. He puts all the emphasis in the event of Transcendence on the radical 
other, which cannot be experienced. It remains strange to us, even though it influences us 
deeply. Levinas emphasizes the difference between human beings and God. A divine 
revelation entails a disruption of our order. Experience implies intentionality2. According to 
Levinas, in Husserl intentionality is the same as identification: to be directed at something is 
to identify with, recognize or conceive it3. Such a mastering over the object by the subject is 
excluded in the relationship to God. That relationship is a “riddle”, a “coming between of a 
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2 Ibid., pp. 97.105.109.
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meaning that disrupts the phenomenon”, in distinction from the phenomenon that belongs to  
our reality4. Levinas sees experience as a mastering over the other. One can thus hardly speak 
of a religious experience.
Levinas’ critique of Husserl is that intentionality is characterized by adequacy, the 
complete agreement between intentionality and that which is the object of the intention5.  By 
thus understanding the relationship to the other along the lines of adequacy, the difference 
between the self and the other is destroyed; the other is translated into terms of myself. 
Precisely in that lies, according to Levinas, the difference from our relationship to God. For 
the idea of the infinite is precisely characterized by inadequacy6. Levinas shows this by 
resorting to Descartes: the idea of the infinite is not produced by me nor equal to me. I am a 
finite substance and cannot therefore derive at the idea of the infinite from myself. This idea 
is derived from a substance that is itself ‘truly infinite’, according to Descartes7. God or the 
idea of the infinite is thus not an object of intentionality which sees  the relationship with the 
other as a matter of adequacy. 
 In order to conceive of God in the way that Descartes indicates, we must, according to 
Levinas accept that the consciousness is not exclusively intentional. The relationship with 
God has to do with a relationship without intentionality, with a thinking that is no longer 
characterized by an aim, with a relationship that displays no will or intention. That is possible 
because there is also a non-intentional consciousness, an indirect consciousness, “certainly 
immediate but without intentional directedness, implicit and purely accompanying”8. This 
pre-reflective consciousness is not an act but pure passivity. Levinas formulates it in ethical 
categories as a “bad conscience: without intentions, without the protective mask of the person 
who with ease and airs and graces emulates the world”9. Because of this non-intentional 
                                                                                                                                                  
3 ID., En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, Paris, Vrin, 1949, p. 22.
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4consciousness, this more than subjective ability, one can be in a relationship to God. That is, 
given the asymmetrical nature of the relationship, not a relationship in the second person, not 
an I-Thou relationship. God is not only not an object but also not a conversation partner10. 
God reveals himself only through one’s fellow human being and in an ethical sense. Others, 
such as the orphan, the widow and stranger address me from a superior position because they 
call me to responsibility. Something of God’s transcendence radiates from them because God 
has a covenant with them. The dimension from  which God speaks to me – ‘beyond being’ is 
that of the third person, who always remains a He11. The other finds himself in the trace of 
this Absence that in an unascertainable  way has passed by, just as Moses saw the back of 
God. There is thus no mutuality in the relation to the Other but only asymmetry. The call,  
God’s word,  bring me into a non-intentional awareness of that which is elusive.
Levinas points out correctly that Transcendence must be conceived of as vertical and 
not horizontal in the sense of a continuation of our human reality. Therefore our idea of God 
does indeed fall outside human intentionality as directedness at the other. Descartes’ idea of 
the Infinite and Anselm’s description in the ontological proof of God’s existence as “that 
which nothing greater can be thought” indicate this. However, the following objections can be 
made against Levinas:
1. Without a doubt, Levinas demonstrates the influence of the transcendent call to human 
action, but by not speaking of religious experience he seems to place the relationship to God 
in a category by itself. Can we nevertheless speak of religious experience, an experience that 
occurs in and with respect to situations in the world, and thus in and with respect to the 
intentional relations of human beings with their environs? That then indicates that religious 
experience in one way or another has something to do with intentionality. One should 
remember here that Levinas provides a one-sided view of intentionality by viewing this as 
theoretical intentionality, as directedness of a subject to an object. If intentionality is viewed 
in that way, it is then difficult to point to any kind of connection. There are, however, other 
forms of intentionality in which religious experience can occur. There is also a pre-theoretical 
intentionality, the intentionality for life, in which objects are not involved. Can the so-called 
non-intentional consciousness not have to do with this intentionality for life in which 
openness for vertical religious Transcendence is guaranteed?
2. It is one-sided to speak of the relationship to God only in the third person. Is the language
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of invocation, lament and dispute directed by humans at God (second person) philosophically 
inconceivable? It is, in addition, one-sided to speak of God only in terms of ethics.
To proceed any further, we must first say something about intentionality. Apart from 
theoretical intentionality, there is also intentionality for life. What this means can best be seen 
in contrast to the way in which Husserl views intentionality.
Husserl’s phenomenology views intentionality as immanent in the consciousness. As a 
rule, we proceed on the assumption that there is world that exists independent of ourselves. 
Husserl calls this view a product of the natural disposition. In the ‘phenomenological 
reduction’ this natural disposition is suspended, through which the phenomenal world appears 
as meaning in relation to my consciousness. The consciousness has an act of ideation 
(Wesensschau) of the essential nature of something, separate from the continually changing 
visible world. The psychological ego living in the world becomes a transcendental ego of 
intentional acts for which the world is the meaning-correlate. It is for that reason that 
Husserl’s phenomenology is called transcendental phenomenology. That which is directed at 
the consciousness is not the object outside of me but the correlate of the consciousness and 
therewith, according to Levinas’ interpretation, the conscious “willed”12. Experience is thus 
viewed as theoretical through the abstraction that occurs through the phenomenological 
reduction from the actuality in which the acts occur. For Husserl, experience is an abstraction 
from daily experience.
Husserl places all the stress on the world that appears to us does so as a function of our 
apparatus of knowing. In itself that is correct, but idealism, i.e. the view that we ourselves are 
the origin of the world is lurking in the background. That, however, goes contrary to our self-
experience. Does Husserl not run into a dead end with his phenomenological reduction? We 
should do justice, in one way or another, to the experience of dependence in the pre-reflective 
areas of our existence, as Husserl’s students do. 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur put all the stress, with respect to intentionality, on the 
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6outside aspect of the consciousness13. Human existence is being-in-the-world. Their 
existential-hermeneutical phenomenology rejects Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology 
but can do take up the later Husserl’s concept of ‘Lebenswelt’. The phenomenology of the 
later Husserl is, namely, more empirical and the world is no longer situated ‘in’ the 
consciousness. Agreeing with this, the existential-hermeneutical phenomenology of Husserl’s 
students attempt to rediscover, behind the objectification and explanations of the science of 
history and sociology, the lived historical experience that precedes and supports these 
objectifications and explanations. 
The issue here is intentionality for life, which is present in different gradations. This 
pre-theoretical intentionality of daily life is to be distinguished from theoretical intentionality 
as that functions in science, where a subject stands over against an object. The first concerns 
daily life and refers to the pre-predicative involvement of the human being with the world, 
persons, and things, in which the issue is being in direct relationship to these things instead of 
objectifying oneself over against them. I do not study the flower; it makes me joyful through 
its color and splendor. This pre-theoretical intentionality has to do with people in their 
individuality, in the daily, familiar way of interacting with what comes one’s way. The second 
refers to the distancing attitude of science, of the subject over against the object. This attitude 
of distance is not a primary but a derivative way of being in the world. Both forms of 
intentionality are closely associated. Our ‘Lebenswelt’ is a reservoir of meanings that makes 
an objectifying and theoretical explanatory attitude possible.
For me, religious experience occurs in the sphere of daily life with its intentionality 
for life. But this does not yet touch upon the uniqueness of religious experience. Intentionality 
for life is a matter of mundane relationships and religious experience, as concern with 
religious Transcendence, is not limited to that. The relationship with God is not only not a 
relationship with an object (theoretical intentionality) but differs just as much from pre-
theoretical relationships in daily life, such as the use of things as ‘instruments’ at work or the 
interpersonal relationship of friendship.
The question is how the event of religious Transcendence can occur in and to the 
world in which we live. Schleiermacher has, in my view, given an answer to this by indicating 
how the relationship to God on the one hand is ‘immediate’ and, on the other, how it occurs in 
and within daily life with its intentionality for life. He also shows that the relationship to God 
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includes more than the ethical. These are two issues that I indicated as problematic in 
Levinas.
Schleiermacher describes the relationship to God as a feeling of absolute dependence and sees 
it as situated in the immediate, non-reflective consciousness. The point of contact between 
God and human beings lies in the immediate consciousness and does not concern an ethical 
relationship but the whole person. The immediate consciousness is the ‘immediate presence 
of whole undivided Being’, also indicated by the word ‘feeling’ which is liable to 
misunderstanding. ‘Feeling’ is not viewed as an emotion but as the heart of the human being. 
This original consciousness precedes knowledge and action. Although distinguished from it, 
this non-reflective consciousness of the human being is connected to his intentional 
consciousness (for life) with his emotions, actions and knowledge. The passive, non-reflective 
consciousness is the hinge, the ‘transition’ between knowledge and action; it mediates the 
transition between moments in which knowledge or action is dominant14. It constitutes the 
unity of knowledge and action and is their common ground15. As an example of how this 
original consciousness functions in conjunction with knowledge and action Schleiermacher 
points to the first encounter of Andrew and John with Jesus as the Christ (John 1).  There is 
first of all the divine point of contact in the original consciousness and subsequently the 
insight “We have found the Messiah” and the act of following.  He states it thus: “The 
influence of the Divine [was] the first [...] out of which proceeded a thought and an act”16.
In this way Schleiermacher demonstrates that the relationship to God, though from the 
start non-reflective, asymmetrical and (as far as human beings are concerned) passive, does 
not exclude language and interpretation. By describing this consciousness as the unity of the 
human subject, he avoids reducing the whole process to a one-sided ethical relationship to 
God. The immediate  consciousness is the heart of the human being, the unity of our whole 
being, of our knowledge, action and emotions. The immediate  relationship to God does not 
exist in isolation but receives its concrete content in the intentionality for life, in the 
intentional consciousness. The ‘I’ of which we are aware is not a pure ‘I’ in itself but one that 
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8is constantly in relation to something17. In other words, the moment of  contact with God does
not exist in isolation but in continual conjunction with the human being’s  involvement with 
the world, and thus with his intentionality for life.  The religious understanding is articulated 
in and through situations in which the human being is involved.
Apart from the object-less Zen meditation or a specific mystical peak experience, in 
daily life people experience God through a lasting religious experience in and through people, 
nature and situations. The religious experience does not thereby become an experience of the 
intentionality for life but is related to it and transcends it by being a religious disclosure. 
Ramsey speaks here of a cosmic disclosure, an insight through which something receives a 
depth-dimension and becomes a ultimate concern and commitment.  The human being is, in 
the end, more than an intentional, acting subject.  In such a disclosure he goes through and 
over the intentional relationships which take place in daily life. For that reason I call the 
relationship to God trans-intentional. Instead of using the term  non-intentional I prefer to use 
the term trans-intentional, the relation to God transcends our intentions.  Religious experience 
is a trans-intentional experience with everyday experiences of the intentionality for life. 
Schleiermacher thus indicates the possibility of a religious experience by pointing to a 
stratified human consciousness.  This, however, does not describe religious experience itself.  
We will do that in the next section.  In the meantime, we can, with Schleiermacher, already 
state that religious experience is not a self-contradictory concept but is to be defined as a 
trans-intentional experience.  In that sense religious experience meets the demand of 
rationality in a semantic sense.  It is not a vague or unclear self-contradictory concept but is to 
be seen as trans-intentional.
III. A DEFINITION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Now that we have seen that religious experience is not a self-contradictory term, we will look 
at the extent to which religious experience is rational in character. We must first, however, 
say something more about religious experience itself and about the concept rationality.
Trans-intentionality is the defining feature of religious experience, but religious 
experience itself includes other aspects, such as narrativity (religious experience occurs 
primarily in the form of a story), and affectivity (religious experience concerns the whole 
person, not only his knowledge and actions but also his heart, mood and emotion).  That 
requires further elucidation.
                                               
17 ID., Der christliche Glaube (n.16), § 9.1.
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Religious experience is a matter of ultimate concern.  The term ‘ultimate’ refers both 
to the involvement of the person (subject pole) as well as that in which the believer is 
involved (object pole). ‘Ultimate’ points not only to the fact that religious experience is a 
matter of the whole person but that the concern exceeds our finite concerns and has to do with 
the ultimate.  The latter is described  above as the trans-intentional aspect of religious 
experience.  It is an ultimate concern that transcends finite concerns.
Narrativity concerns both poles of the ultimate concern, the believer and that in which 
the believer is involved, the faith-content. If we look at experiences of God, such as those 
recounted in Scripture, then we see that the content of such experiences is often given in story 
form (Exodus, Kings, or the gospels and Acts). The content of faith also recognizes genres 
other than narratives, such as the commandments, wisdom literature, poetry, prophecy and 
apocalyptic literature, but the fundamental form is the narrative of God interacting with 
people. Where Scripture speaks of God and Christ, that occurs primarily in the form of story. 
Narrativity concerns not only the content of religious experience but also the way in which 
that has been appropriated by human beings. The human being is affected in his heart, in his 
identity. The identity of the human being remains abstract if we do not take its historicity into 
account: alive in the present, the human being is related to the past and the future. Identity is 
then best expressed in the life story of the human beings. Identity is narrative identity. Thus 
religious experience is doubly narrative in nature both with respect to content as well as to its 
reception.
The second aspect of religious experience, affectivity, concerns the receiver.  Religious 
experience is a matter of the whole person.  Affectivity is more than emotion: it has the whole 
person in view: his heart, mood and emotion; it also has a fundamental influence on the 
insights and actions that arise out of faith. Affectivity is not something irrational, as 
Heidegger shows in Sein und Zeit and De Sousa shows in his emotion theory18. Affectivity 
does not exclude cognition. The understanding makes something coherent out of that which 
has affected us in our heart. Thus communication about religious experience is possible.  With 
Pascal I say that knowing God is a matter of the heart: “It is the heart which perceives God 
and not the reason. That is what faith is: God perceived by the heart, not by the reason”19. In 
religious experience the human being comes into contact with God as an affective being (and 
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thereby as a cognitive and acting being).
  I would describe religious experience as a trans-intentional experience in which the 
human being is confronted with religious Transcendence in his narrative identity and in his 
affectivity, an experience that is recorded primarily in narrative form. In brief, religious 
experience is a trans-intentional experience in which the whole person is concerned with 
religious Transcendence. We should add: Religious experience occurs suddenly, as seen in 
conversion experiences and mystical experiences. It can also be  a lasting experience, such as 
the lasting experience of faith in which the believer has daily experiences that are stamped in 
one way or another by his faith: Faith as “experience with experiences” (Ebeling, Jüngel). 
That is the lasting experience that must be continually nourished by liturgy, Scripture, 
encounters with people, etc.  Sometimes, in addition to the lasting experience, momentary, 
abrupt and intense experience plays a role. There is interaction between the two.  The lasting 
religious experience can have a preparatory role for a sudden experience and the sudden 
experience, such as a conversion experience, can bring about a lasting religious experience.  
However that may be, if I pose the question of the rationality of religious experience, than I 
view religious experience primarily as a lasting religious experience of the ‘ordinary’ 
believer.
IV. THE RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Rationality is concerned with the human being – his convictions, values and acts.  I view 
rationality, as I stated, as a normative concept and that it concerns the right and responsible 
use of our abilities as humans to be reasonable. The statement ‘it is reasonable to believe in 
God’ refers to a conviction. The statement ‘John is reasonable’ refers to John’s behavior. The 
values for which people strive are also considered be rational or not.  We consider an act that 
is directed at self-destruction or destruction of society as irrational.  Rationality thus has to do 
with convictions (what is reasonable to believe), with actions (what is reasonable to do) and 
with values (what is reasonable to prefer). However, rationality is broader. We can also, for 
example, require of theology that it be rational in character both semantically and logically: 
the concepts used in theology should be semantically rational and not vague or unclear. 
Logically, theology should be rational as well. It demonstrates that God’s actions transcend 
reason but do not destroy it20.
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Can we say of religious experience that it is rational? We do say of a person, a 
conviction, an act or a value that it is rational. Does that also obtain for experience? Can we 
ask if it is reasonable to experience something? One can, with the accent on the experiential 
moment of being touched, say that the person has no choice in the matter, that it does not 
concern the ‘right use of our abilities as human beings to be reasonable’ and that therefore we 
cannot speak of something like the rationality of religious experience.  We saw that in the pre-
reflective consciousness there can be contact with God.  I would say that it is a right and 
responsible use of our abilities to respond or not to the contact with God.  One can speak of 
choice in the sense that one can choose to respond, to give ear or not to the summons. I 
further described religious experience more broadly as a trans-intentional experience in which 
the whole person is involved with religious Transcendence. The lasting religious experience 
interprets the world religiously and that implies convictions and actions. Viewed in this way, 
religious experience has rational aspects.  Rationality, after all, has to do with convictions and 
actions.
We can, I conclude, speak of the rationality of religious experience. We can speak so, 
first of all in the semantic sense. The concept ‘religious experience’ is not self-contradictory, 
because experience is not exclusively intentional.  But is religious experience rational also in 
the logical sense?  An aesthetic experience is also trans-intentional, but there we have to do 
with something belonging to this world. In a religious experience as concern of the human 
with religious Transcendence it concerns an action by God.
I will now take up the question of the extent to which the rationality of religious 
experience can be determined by discussing the above three aspects briefly, beginning with 
the trans-intentional aspect.
V. THE TRANS-INTENTIONAL ASPECT
The trans-intentional aspect of religious experience was described as the aspect of contact 
between God and the human being in the heart of the human being, the immediate, non-
reflective consciousness (Schleiermacher). This still does not describe the (possibility of the) 
experience as event; it simply describes the condition for its possibility in the human 
consciousness. Marion has described the possibility of religious experience as event in his 
Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness21. In this phenomonology of gift he 
                                               
21 J.-L. MARION, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, California, Stanford University Press, 
2002. The term ‘donation’ (‘giving’) is both a verb as well as the result: the gift (see pp. 61.65).
12
provides a description of the phenomenon of a revelation by God. Here it concerns what I call 
the trans-intentional aspect of religious experience. Marion shows that this is not an irrational
event but as a phenomenon can be described rationally.
A revelation by God can be conceived as, as Marion calls it, a saturated, replete 
phenomenon par excellence. Husserl held that intuition was the basis for the appearance of a 
phenomenon. We all look at things from our own perspective, but we do not see them 
completely. We see only a certain side of the cube from our limited horizon. The phenomenon 
is thus characterized by a shortage that we need to supplement. It is my intention, my 
directedness that provides the supplementation and allows me to see the object as a cube. 
Marion asks: “To the phenomenon characterized most often by lack or poverty of intuition 
[…] why wouldn’t there correspond the possibility of a phenomenon where intuition would 
give more, indeed immeasurably more, than the intention would ever have aimed at or 
foreseen?”22 Mundane examples of such a saturated, replete phenomenon can be found in 
historical events such as the French Revolution. So many factors are in play here that every 
explanation falls short. This phenomenon yields more than any intention of the players in that 
event. There is a plethora of ‘horizons’ that make it impossible to fix the event as an object23. 
Or one can take a painting as an example. The experience of seeing the painting transcends 
the understanding. It is not, as Husserl’s phenomenon is, an inadequate perception that needs 
to be supplemented by intentionality but yields excessively more than what the viewer 
expects. The phenomenon is saturated, replete. We see here that how something appears to us 
is intensified in the saturated phenomenon. This phenomenon overwhelms me, as when I look 
into the sun. Instead of there being a shortage of intuition or perception, there is an 
abundance, and the perception of the phenomenon is no longer dependent on my 
intentionality. Marion cites Christ as an example of a religious phenomenon: Christ went 
beyond the Old Testament expectations of the Messiah. The radiant, luminous cloud that 
appeared during the transfiguration on the mountain makes the disciples fall down out of fear 
(Matt 17,6-8 and parallel passages in the other gospels). Here the different types of the 
saturated phenomenon merge together here, whereby the saturated phenomenon is doubled24. 
Revelation is a doubled saturated phenomenon: “giving oneself is revealing oneself”25.
Marion conceives of God phenomenologically as gift, God as being-as-given par 
excellence. By way of describing what I have called the trans-intentional aspect of religious 
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experience, he argues the following26:
1. The term ‘par excellence’ entails that God contacts human beings as a gift without any 
limitations. When such happens, the infinite (in quantitative sense) surpasses that which we 
can see. It is therefore different from many other phenomena, of which we constantly see only 
a part of it, depending on our point of view. God, however, reveals himself in the way that a 
cubist painter unfolds all dimensions of an object so that they are all visible. “God reveals 
himself given unreservedly, with nothing withheld”27.
2. This absolute way of appearing is such that it saturates each and every horizon “with a 
dazzling obviousness”. Marion brings two aspects of the saturated phenomenon together here. 
First of all the dazzling obviousness: the aspect of the saturated phenomenon that indicates 
that the phenomenon not only quantitatively but also qualitatively exceeds our view infinitely. 
This overcomes us literally when we look into the sun through which everything is 
overexposed. “‘God’ in his very dazzlingness shines by his absence”28. One can think here of 
the story of Jesus’ transfiguration on the mountain: “There he was transfigured before them. 
His clothes became dazzling white, whiter than anyone in the world could bleach them” 
(Mark 9,2f.).
He also speaks of the absolute way of appearing that saturates every horizon. This 
‘absoluteness’  refers to the type of saturated phenomenon that appears without any relation to 
anything else, in an absolute way. In Being Given this type is called “flesh”, viewed as 
unmediated presence in itself29. In connection with absolute way of appearing one can think 
of Jesus’ statement that the Kingdom of God is not of this world30.
3. The gift par excellence can thus change into a gift of ‘abandonment’. We try to manipulate 
and define most mundane phenomena. But that is not possible here. For God as phenomenon 
par excellence it obtains that “here, by contrast, a radical non-availability makes their 
abandonment inevitable … it [the phenomenon] abandons itself to the point of disappearing 
                                                                                                                                                  
25 Ibid., pp. 234-45.
26 J.-L. MARION, Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Summary for Theologians, in G. WARD (ed.), The 
Postmodern God, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 279-96. 
27 Ibid., p. 292.
28 Ibid., p. 292. 
29 MARION, Being Given (n.22), p. 231f.
30 In Being Given the saturated phenomenon is viewed according to the category of modality as “not to be 
looked at”, because it, like the ‘face’ in Levinas, cannot be reduced to the ‘I’ (Ibid., p. 232f.).
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as an object that is possessable, manipulable, discernible”31. In Being Given this is the general 
characteristic of the phenomenon as gift. Giving itself is the same as “‘letting appear without 
reserve and in person’, to ‘abandoning itself to sight’, in short to pure appearing of a 
phenomenon”32. 
Marion confirms what has already been stated above. Experience is not defined only 
by intentionality. The contact with God is also an experience, even if it is not intentional. 
Viewed in this way, this aspect of religious experience cannot be irrational but is rather to be 
viewed as rational in the sense that it is to be described philosophically as a saturated 
phenomenon par excellence. This aspect of religious experience is rational not only 
semantically but also logically as a paradox par excellence33. It concerns a paradox in the 
sense that it transcends all human expectations and possibilities. God gives himself as a gift 
without “forethought, without measure, without analogy, without repetition- in short, it 
remains unavailable”34. An action by God to people does not destroy reason but transcends it 
as a paradox par excellence.
Thus, we can speak rationally of religious experience as a saturated phenomenon. This 
is the first step to answering the question of whether speaking of religious experience entails 
fideism, the view that it cannot be discussed by means of rational argumentation. We will 
therefore look at the other two aspects of religious experience. The question of the rationality 
of religious experience does not concern only the trans-intentional aspect but also the content 
of religious experience and the acceptance of the religious message. As far as the content is 
concerned, this can have to do with the rationality of the central truths such as God as person, 
God as the triune God, the incarnation, etc. I will limit myself to the form of the content of 
faith that, as stated, is primarily narrative in nature. I will indicate that telling a story is a form 
of argumentation and that stories like the gospel stories can give an explanation for the 
paradoxical event that a human being can be full of power and at the same time be the 
suffering Son of Man.
VI. THE NARRATIVE FORM OF THE CONTENT OF FAITH: THE NARRATIVE EXPLANATION
To follow a story is to follow a contingent course of events and that seems like following an 
                                               
31 MARION, Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Summary for Theologians,, p.292f.
32 Id., Being Given (n.22), pp. 74. 60.90
33 Ibid., p. 235.
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argument, whereby the question is: is it convincing? The narration and description of an event 
is at the same time an explanation. Is the story convincing in what it wants to assert? The 
reader is – and that constitutes the excitement in a story – constantly surprised by the turns the 
story makes, by the circumstances and the reactions of the characters in the story. Is the story 
successful in bringing together the heterogeneous givens and therewith in giving an 
explanation for the events? Explanation here is something different from explanation in the 
sciences – it is not predictive in nature. In history we have to do not only with the actions of 
people but also with unintended consequences. A gospel story is even more complex because 
it also shows how God’s plan and the actions of human beings, of Jesus and his opponents, 
come together. Mark shows this in his story of the events that lead to the crucifixion of Jesus. 
At issue here is a different kind of explanation than one that explains them on the basis of 
laws. Von Wright speaks of a quasi-causal explanation, by which he has in view the “internal 
coherence” in a historical story35. In a historical event we come across coherences that are 
neither logical nor empirical and thus do not fit well into the classical division of rational 
‘ideas’ and empirical facts36. The plot in the gospel story by Mark, for example, has what 
Ricoeur calls the characteristic of “discordant concordance”, contradictory agreement. Mark 
tries to explain how Jesus combats demons and liberates people from them and is at the same 
time the suffering Son of Man.
Stories thus have an argumentative power. They can serve as arguments both in 
religion as well in law cases. The plot fulfils the function of deduction in a formal proof. For 
someone who is the perpetrator of a crime we do not often have silent witnesses such as DNA 
or fingerprints but only explanations, i.e. stories, by witnesses who can show convincingly
how the facts hang together can be used as evidence so the judgement of guilty or not guilty is 
beyond reasonable doubt. The gospel story also gives an explanation for the actual event that 
a just person died on the cross but was resurrected from the dead. Mark provides this by, for 
example, placing Jesus’ death in the context of the explanation of God’s eschatological 
struggle with Satan, the powers of destruction. Mark explains why the events happened as 
they did and how power (Jesus’ miraculous power against the destructive powers) and
weakness (his suffering as sacrifice, as service) go together. In this way he is the Son of God.
Rationality does not only concern the content of faith and its form but also the receiver 
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of the testimony to Transcendence. To what extent is the receiver rational in his acceptance of 
the content of faith? The status of the believer is that of witness. He himself, like the prophets, 
receives a message or is dependent on the message that others have received. To what extent 
is the witness reasonable with respect to the acceptance of this witness?
VII. THE RATIONALITY OF THE BELIEVER: BELIEVING IN
For the question of the extent to which the witness is reasonable in accepting the message, we 
must determine the nature of the message. Belief concerns convictions of non-geometrical 
nature that demand our commitment and touch our whole being, our affectivity. We described 
faith-knowledge as knowing God with the heart. Faith-knowledge is affective-cognitive in 
character. Pascal  speaks in this connection of le sentiment and Schleiermacher of feeling in 
the sense of heart. The understanding bases itself on principle and proof, whereas the heart 
follows its own dictates. Faith-knowledge is concerned with knowledge that has to do with 
love37. 
Kant also has the unique nature of faith convictions in mind when he refers to it as 
Vernunftglaube. The content of faith convictions therewith falls outside the epistemological 
distinction between knowledge and opinion. It is not just an opinion but has to do with our life 
orientation about which we do not speak in terms of accidental opinion but of ultimate 
concern. Neither is it any form of scientific knowledge. Faith convictions are after all not to 
be arrived by scientific, deductive or inductive means. Faith convictions for Kant are a matter 
of ‘ideas’ in distinction from those of (natural) science and historical reality. The latter is, in 
my view however, in conflict with the historical character of faith. The witness to faith is 
anchored in history, with its salvific facts of the cross and the resurrection. The question of 
the historical trustworthiness of the Old and New Testament is of course a matter for 
historical criticism. Even if one, as a historian, would agree with the historical hints for the 
story told by the evangelists, that does not say that one accepts the story as a believer. At issue 
is more than the historical side of it. The question of historical anchoring is a necessary 
condition for the acceptance of the witness but not a sufficient condition. The sufficient 
condition consists in the acceptance of a witness as presenting truth pertaining to life and has 
the character of an act of trust. This truth is primarily existential truth but presupposes an 
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anchoring in history. For that reason faith convictions are better characterized as professions, 
as a believing-in than as Vernunftglaube. The profession concerns the truth of faith that Jesus 
is the Christ, the Son of God (truth as historicality (Geschichtlichkeit)) and presupposes the 
historical life of Jesus (truth as history). A false witness – false in the twofold sense of 
inauthentic (in the existential sense) and untrue (in the historical sense) is always possible. 
Believing is vulnerable and full of risks.
Believing in, profession, is a question of trust, because witnesses can be false. That 
does not make believing-in irrational. The reasonableness of accepting a witness stands and 
falls with the inquiry into the trustworthiness of the witness. To witness to someone or 
something is, if it concerns a religious witness, a way of acting and speaking, whereby the 
whole person and his authenticity is involved. Witnesses can be tested as to their 
trustworthiness, as in mystical literature tests have been developed to establish the 
authenticity of a witness38. We need to approve witnesses critically who differ with respect to 
facts that can be established as well as with respect to pure opinion.
Is it rational to accept a belief or a witness? The answer is yes according to the model 
of rationality called ‘Presumptionism’. The principle of Presumption is: It is rational to accept 
a belief /a witness unless there are good reasons to cease from thinking that it is true.39   
If we see that the trans-intentional aspect of religious experience can be described 
philosophically as a saturated phenomenon, that biblical stories in their narrative form give a 
narrative explanation of the faith that Jesus is the Son of God and that the acceptance of the 
biblical witness is a matter of believing-in whereby true and false witnesses need to be 
distinguished, then religious experience is rational in nature. Speaking of religious experience 
does not entail fideism, because one can talk about it rationally, as I have shown, by means of 
the three aspects of religious experience.
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Summary Stoker will investigate the extent to which living on the basis of a lasting religious 
experience can be discussed rationally. Religious experience is described as a trans-
intentional experience in which the human being is confronted with religious Transcendence 
in his narrative identity and in his affectivity, an experience that the Schriptures recorded 
primarily in narrative form. He shows that the trans-intentional aspect of religious experience 
can be described philosophically as a saturated phenomenon, that biblical stories in their 
narrative form give a narrative explanation of the faith that Jesus is the Son of God and that 
the affective acceptance of the biblical witness is a matter of believing-in whereby true and 
false witnesses need to be distinguished. Religious experience is therefore rational in nature
and does not entail fideism.
Stoker will investigate the extent to which living on the basis of a lasting religious experience 
fideism, the view that religious experience cannot be discussed rationally.
